Pakistan’s Electoral System: Challenges, Reforms, and the Path Forward

The Pakistan electoral system looks solid on paper. There is a written constitution, a detailed Elections Act, an independent commission and a vote every five years. Yet after almost every general election, the losing side says the result was engineered, the winning side says the critics are sore losers, and ordinary voters are left unsure which story to believe. That cycle of doubt has become the most damaging feature of the Pakistan electoral system, more damaging than any single flawed count.

This article looks at the problem without taking a party’s side. It explains how the Pakistan electoral system works, walks through documented cases of manipulation from the 1990 election to the disputed 2024 vote, and sorts today’s problems into seven clear categories. It then covers what reformers have already tried, what the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) is planning now, and which changes would make the biggest practical difference.

A note on method. Where courts have ruled, I say so. Where the evidence comes from observer groups such as FAFEN, I name them. Where something is an allegation that has been denied, I call it an allegation. Electoral reform only works when people can agree on the facts first, so accuracy matters more here than outrage.

How the Pakistan Electoral System Works

Before judging the Pakistan electoral system, it helps to know its basic design. Pakistan elects its National Assembly and four provincial assemblies through direct voting in single-member constituencies. Whoever gets the most votes in a constituency wins, even without a majority. Women and minority seats are reserved and filled from party lists based on each party’s share of general seats.

First-Past-the-Post and the Constituency Map

This method is called first-past-the-post (FPTP). It is simple to understand and it ties a representative to a local area. Critics point out that it can overlook minority voices, while proportional representation gives smaller parties a fairer share of seats, as Dawn noted in its comparison of systems used in the UK and India against those common in Europe. Pakistan has not moved to proportional representation, but the debate keeps returning whenever a party wins far fewer seats than its vote share suggests.

FPTP also makes delimitation of constituencies politically loaded. If one constituency has far more voters than another, votes carry unequal weight. FAFEN raised this in an earlier assessment, saying at least 81 National Assembly and 92 Provincial Assembly constituencies did not meet the legal requirement of a population variation within 10 percent.

The Election Commission and the Legal Framework

The ECP runs elections, prepares electoral rolls and supervises results. Its composition was changed through the 22nd Amendment in 2016, which introduced reforms to the composition and mandate of the Electoral Commission. The Elections Act, 2017 then consolidated and unified the laws on the conduct of elections, and you can read the current texts on the ECP’s own election laws page.

Here is the uncomfortable point. The legal design is not the main problem. A research paper from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics argues that the electoral laws are generally sound and the ECP is designed to be autonomous, but the problem lies in implementation and in respect for those laws. That is a useful way to read everything that follows.

A Short History of Election Rigging in Pakistan

The Pakistan electoral system carries a long memory. Voters do not judge each election in isolation. They judge it against decades of precedent, and the precedent is not good.

1977 and the Years of Managed Politics

The March 1977 election is the classic early example. The opposition alliance rejected the results, street protests spread, and the crisis ended with a military takeover in July. The International Crisis Group, in its report on reforming Pakistan’s electoral system, makes a broader point: successive military governments rigged national, provincial and local polls to ensure their own survival. Manipulation was not an accident of poor administration. It was often a deliberate tool of state.

The 1990 Election and the Asghar Khan Case

The 1990 election is the best documented case because a court ruled on it. In 1996, Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan petitioned the Supreme Court, alleging that money totaling Rs140 million was distributed among politicians to manipulate the 1990 polls and defeat Benazir Bhutto. In October 2012 the court delivered its verdict. It held that there was ample evidence the election was rigged and that a political cell in the presidency had supported the formation of the IJI to stop a PPP victory.

What happened next matters just as much as the ruling. The FIA later told the court that the authorities did not have enough evidence to launch a criminal prosecution against the people named in the judgment. Dawn’s editorial view was blunt: there has been no accountability, either for those who administered the slush fund or for those who received it. Many of the politicians named denied taking money. The lesson for the Pakistan electoral system is that even a landmark judgment can fade if nobody is required to act on it.

2013 and 2018

After the 2013 election, allegations of irregularities led the government to belatedly appoint a commission of inquiry, and that episode fed into the 22nd Amendment. In 2018, the results transmission system stalled on election night, and the opposition parties alleged interference. Different winners, different losers, same pattern of doubt. Each side has called the process fair when it won and unfair when it lost, which is exactly why institutions, not personalities, need to carry the trust.

Case Study: The 2024 General Election

The February 2024 vote shows how the Pakistan electoral system behaves under stress. It is also the election voters remember most clearly, so it deserves a careful look at what the record shows.

What Observers Documented

FAFEN, Pakistan’s main domestic observer network, reported that Form 45 was not affixed at a conspicuous place outside almost one-third (29.4%) of the observed polling stations. Form 45 is the polling station result sheet, and displaying it is how candidates and voters can check the count on the spot.

Other concerns raised after polling included:

• Delayed results and late uploading of Form 45.
• Missing polling agent signatures on some forms.
• Mismatches between Form 45 and Form 47 in some constituencies. Form 47 is the constituency-level consolidation prepared by the returning officer.
• Denied access to returning officer offices during result compilation.
• Slow handling of election petitions.

Geo News summarized these points in a review one year on, noting that in one constituency the winner’s total on Form 47 exceeded the combined Forms 45 by 11,817 votes. That is one reported case, not proof of a nationwide pattern, but it shows why observers keep asking for a full audit.

Turnout and Thin Mandates

Participation also fell. FAFEN’s analysis of Form 47 data found turnout slipped from 52.1 percent in 2018 to 47.6 percent in 2024. Part of the drop came from a big jump in registered voters, from 106 million in 2018 to 128.6 million in 2024. Cold weather and security fears in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan probably played a part too.

The most striking number came later. FAFEN told a Senate committee that successful candidates secured only 21 percent of registered votes, which raises questions about the legitimacy of their mandates. FAFEN also recommended a comprehensive audit of Form 45, cross-checked against Forms 46, 47 and 48.

The Other Side of the Argument

Fairness requires saying that the ECP and the winning parties rejected the claim that results were manipulated, and that observers also credited the ECP for holding the vote at all. FAFEN’s chairperson said at the time that it was laudable that the commission conducted the election despite criticism from political parties. The Pakistan electoral system can be criticized for its result management and still be credited for delivering a national poll under difficult conditions. Both things are true.

7 Harsh Truths About the Pakistan Electoral System

Putting history and the 2024 record together, seven problems keep repeating.

1. The ECP’s Independence Is Tested Under Pressure

Independence on paper is not independence in practice. The PIDE paper says the autonomy of the ECP is frequently undermined. The same paper describes a hybrid system, where power does not solely reside in Parliament or the Constitution. When the referee can be leaned on, every decision looks suspect, even the correct ones.

2. Results Management Is the Weakest Link

Voting day itself often passes reasonably well. The trouble starts when polling station numbers are consolidated. Missing signatures, forms that do not add up and delayed uploads all create room for doubt. A system where Form 45 and Form 47 are publicly verifiable, fast and consistent would close much of that gap.

3. Pre-Poll Engineering Shapes the Field

Rigging is not only about the count. The PIDE paper notes that manipulation occurs at various stages: pre-poll, during the polling process, and post-poll. Candidate disqualifications, uneven access to campaigning, and legal decisions on party symbols all affect the outcome before a single ballot is cast. In 2024, the Supreme Court’s ruling on intra-party elections meant the PTI lost its electoral symbol, the cricket bat, and its candidates had to run as independents. The court decision was legal, but the ECP’s handling and timing of the matter remain contested. Whatever one thinks of it, a system where symbol allocation can reshape an election is fragile.

4. Delimitation and Voter Lists Are Contested Ground

Unequal constituencies, disputed census figures and errors in electoral rolls all quietly bias outcomes. Delimitation is technical work, so it rarely gets public attention until it is too late to challenge.

5. Money and Campaign Finance Escape Oversight

FAFEN has warned that social media has opened new avenues for third-party financing of campaigns, including from sources prohibited by law. Spending limits exist, but enforcement is thin. Elite candidates with large budgets face little scrutiny, while smaller parties cannot compete.

6. Disputes Take Too Long to Resolve

An election petition that takes years to decide is a petition that changes nothing. FAFEN has said the complexity of filing complaints with election tribunals is a significant concern. Tribunals need firm timelines and simpler procedures, or the law offers a remedy that people cannot actually use.

7. Low Turnout Weakens the Mandate

When turnout falls near 48 percent and winners represent about a fifth of registered voters, the mandate is thin even before any rigging claim. That thinness makes every dispute louder.

Reforms Already Tried

The Pakistan electoral system has not stood still. Past reforms include:

1. The 22nd Amendment (2016), which reworked how the ECP is composed.
2. The Elections Act, 2017, which merged several laws into one framework.
3. Attempts in 2021 to allow electronic voting machines and voting by overseas Pakistanis, which drew opposition objections and were rolled back in 2022.
4. Mandatory reporting of gender-disaggregated turnout, which started in 2018.

Some recent moves worry observers. In January 2026, the National Assembly passed the Elections Amendment Bill, which allows the assets of lawmakers to be kept secret if publication could pose a risk to them, over the objection of the opposition. The government’s stated reason was to balance transparency with the protection of individual rights. Supporters see a security measure. Critics see a step back from asset disclosure. Either way, it shows how easily reform can point in the wrong direction.

What the ECP Is Planning Now

There is a fresh opening. In July 2026 the ECP revived its Legal Reforms Committee, which will review the legal and constitutional shortcomings that surfaced during the 2024 general elections. Reports say the review of the Elections Act and Election Rules is expected to be finalized by December 2026. That timeline gives citizens and parties a few months to push for specific changes.

Reforms the Pakistan Electoral System Still Needs

Good intentions need concrete targets. Based on the record above, here is what would matter most for the Pakistan electoral system.

Fix Results Management First

• Require every presiding officer to give certified Form 45 copies to all polling agents and post one outside the station, with penalties for failure.
• Publish scanned Forms 45 for every polling station on a public portal within hours, not days.
• Make any arithmetic error in Form 45 trigger a mandatory recount, as FAFEN’s own audit framework proposes.
• Bar returning officers from changing Form 47 totals without a written, public order.

Protect the ECP from Pressure

Appointments to the commission should follow open, cross-party procedures with fixed terms. The ECP should also control its own security and staffing arrangements on election day, so it does not depend on officials answerable to the government of the day.

Make Election Tribunals Fast

Set a hard deadline, for example 120 days, for deciding election petitions. Allow electronic filing. Publish tribunal delays every year so the public can see which ones are stuck.

Regulate Campaign Money and Social Media

Require parties to file audited accounts on time, and publish them. The ECP has already told parties to submit financial statements under Section 210 of the Elections Act, which is a useful start. Add rules on paid political advertising online and on foreign-funded campaigns.

Use Technology With Safeguards

Technology can help, but it has to be introduced carefully. Electronic transmission of results, overseas voting and biometric checks all need pilot runs, independent audits and cross-party agreement before national use. A rushed rollout, as the 2018 transmission failure showed, can cause exactly the distrust it was meant to prevent.

Consider Proportional Elements

A mixed system that adds a proportional tier could reduce the wasted-vote problem and give smaller parties a fairer share. This is a longer conversation, but it is worth having openly, not only after a disputed result.

The Path Forward for the Pakistan Electoral System

Reform is not only a job for the ECP or parliament. Each group has a specific role.

Political parties need to agree on rules before an election, not after it. A reform passed by the government alone, and reversed by the next one, is not a reform.

The judiciary must decide election disputes quickly and enforce its own verdicts. The Asghar Khan case shows what happens when a ruling has no follow-through.

Civil society and media should keep doing what FAFEN and independent journalists already do: count, compare and publish. You can read the network’s reports directly on the FAFEN website.

Voters carry weight too. Checking your name on the electoral roll, asking for the Form 45 copy at your polling station and voting even when you doubt the outcome all raise the cost of manipulation. Turnout of 48 percent leaves too much room for a small number of decisions to determine the result.

The Pakistan electoral system will not become credible overnight. But it does not need perfection to regain trust. It needs consistent, checkable rules that apply to every party, whether it is winning or losing.

Conclusion

The Pakistan electoral system rests on decent laws, but its credibility has repeatedly been damaged by weak enforcement, contested results management, pre-poll pressure and slow justice, a pattern visible from the 1977 crisis through the Asghar Khan verdict on the 1990 election to the disputed 2024 vote, where observers documented missing Form 45 postings, mismatched forms and turnout near 48 percent with winners holding about 21 percent of registered votes; the ECP’s new reform committee and its December 2026 review timeline offer a real chance to fix these gaps by publishing polling station results quickly, protecting the commission’s independence, speeding up election tribunals, regulating campaign money and introducing technology only after honest pilots, and whether that chance is used will depend on parties agreeing on rules before the next election, courts enforcing their own decisions, and citizens insisting on evidence they can check.